Nigeria hits late summer busy on all fronts but with little to show that the tide is turning. Tinubu is courting the Global South, trading Benin Bronzes for soft power, pushing to patch up ECOWAS and locking in a headline loan for a showpiece coastal highway. He’s also signed fresh security pacts with the UK and France, even as relations with Washington cool – tighter visa rules and new tariffs signalling that Nigeria is no longer being given the benefit of the doubt. On the surface it is a flurry of wins. In practice, every move is hostage to the same old problem – execution. The economy has flickers of improvement but the power sector is in a public brawl with creditors and brewers warn tax policy could crush their rebound. Security is sliding. Terror attacks are deadlier. Yet Nigeria is still only reacting and not getting ahead of the threat. The risk is obvious. Without delivery on the big pledges and a shift to proactive security, August’s flurry could go down as another month where the headlines outpaced the results.
Brazil Trade Deal. Nigeria’s new agricultural agreement with Brazil looks good on paper — access to machinery, tech and training to lift local output. But the real play here is diplomatic. With US aid frozen and China’s outreach slowing, Tinubu is leaning into South–South partnerships to plug the gaps. The gamble is Brazil’s own volatility and protectionist streak, which could blunt any real gains. If it delivers, Nigeria diversifies its trade partners and chips away at oil dependency. If it stalls, Abuja is left with another missed opportunity and one less route out of over-reliance on the West.
US Relations. Washington’s decision to tighten Nigeria’s visa waiver programme lands alongside fresh tariff measures on African imports, underscoring a cooler tone in bilateral ties. It’s not a rupture, but the signal is clear — Nigeria is no longer being given the benefit of the doubt in Washington. For Tinubu, it’s another reason to double down on diversifying partnerships, even if that means leaning harder into the Global South.
Benin Bronzes. The June return of 119 Benin Bronzes from the Netherlands is part of a broader repatriation wave — France, Germany and the US have sent pieces back since 2021 — but the UK remains largely unmoved, with only a handful trickling out from institutions like Jesus College and the Horniman Museum. That hesitancy is telling. Major holders appear to be watching how Nigeria handles what it already has. Conservation, security, public access and keeping politics out of the display case will all be judged. Get it right and Nigeria builds trust for future returns; get it wrong and it hands reluctant institutions the perfect excuse to keep their collections.
Opposition Alliance. Atiku Abubakar and Peter Obi joined forces under the Africa Democratic Congress in late May. The pair formally unveiled their pact on 2nd July in Abuja. The goal? To halt Tinubu’s march towards one-party dominance in 2027. On paper, it’s a heavyweight pairing; in practice, history is stacked against them. Nigerian alliances have a habit of collapsing under the weight of personality clashes, competing ambitions and weak grassroots machinery. This one has to survive nearly two years of sustained campaigning — an eternity in Nigeria’s political cycle — without fracturing. If it holds, the map could shift; if it cracks, it’ll be another headline that went nowhere.
ECOWAS Reset. Abuja is leading a push to bring Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger back into ECOWAS, moving from sanctions and ultimatums to a softer “big tent” approach. The reset matters: the bloc’s credibility has been in free fall since those states quit in 2024, tilting towards Russia and away from regional integration. Rebuilding ties would mark a major policy shift and a chance for Nigeria to reclaim lost leadership. But suspicion runs deep. Many in ECOWAS see this as an exercise in Nigerian self-interest, and the bloc’s track record on enforcement is poor. Pulling them back in would be a coup; failing would be a public reminder of just how fragile West Africa’s political order has become.
Security Pacts. Tinubu’s new counter-terrorism and maritime security agreements with France and the UK promise training, intelligence sharing and tech transfers. The weak spot is Nigeria’s own follow-through. Past partnerships have withered from poor coordination, shifting priorities and underfunding. Without sustained political will and proper resourcing, these deals risk becoming another set of dust-gathering MOUs.
Numbers. Inflation has eased for a third straight month, to 22.22% in June – still crippling for consumers. Q1 GDP growth hit 3.13% year on year, with the IMF now projecting 3.4% for 2025, helped by stronger oil output, cooling prices and better investor sentiment. First-half GDP was up 3.7%, pushing Nigeria to 55th globally in nominal terms. Oil output is back to 1.8m bpd – the highest in months – after tighter security curbed theft but Brent under USD 70 makes Abuja’s USD 75/barrel budget assumption look shaky. The naira sits at NGN1,540 officially, with black-market trades in the NGN1,550 to 1,570 range. Public debt has climbed to NGN149 trillion (USD 97bn), with debt service swallowing 80 to 90% of revenues. The numbers show a recovery of sorts – but one built on fragile oil prices, overstretched budgets and a still jittery FX market.
Lagos–Calabar Coastal Highway. In July, Abuja secured a USD 747 million syndicated loan led by Deutsche Bank to kick-start this 700 km coastal artery linking ports, industrial hubs and tourism zones. Done right, it could cut transport costs, boost trade and attract investment. But the risks are high: land disputes, environmental pushback, contractor politics and a financing gap that runs into the billions. With 2027 elections on the horizon, there’s every chance it becomes a campaign prop rather than a delivery priority. Nigeria’s mega-project record is riddled with delays and overruns – unless funding, politics and execution stay aligned. If you’re a gambling person – the odds of this ending up being only half-built hover close to 50/50 so will you place a bet?.
Power Sector Dispute. On 6 August, an advert in ThisDay – paid for by FBNQuest Trustees on behalf of creditor banks – announced that a court-appointed receiver had taken control of Egbin Power, Ikeja Electric and First Independent Power. The companies deny it, citing injunctions against adverse action. But the way it was done – in the pages of ThisDay rather than behind closed doors – has jolted investors. In Nigeria, major disputes in capital-intensive sectors are usually handled quietly to protect market confidence. This public show of force signals deeper fractures between lenders and operators and raises doubts over whether other infrastructure deals could face the same treatment. With FX shortages, heavy debts and patchy regulation already in play, this dispute risks freezing fresh capital not just in power but across infrastructure finance. The timing is poor, coming as Abuja faces a fiscal squeeze and looming Eurobond repayments.
Beer. Breweries are bouncing back. Nigerian Breweries swung from a NGN 65.6bn loss to a NGN 69.99bn Q1 profit, with Guinness Nigeria up 53% in revenue. But the Beer Sectoral Group warns that current excise duty policy could strip NGN 425bn from earnings and cut sales by 30%, pushing consumers towards cheap, unsafe alcohol. The bright spot is innovation: Bature Brewery, Nigeria’s biggest craft player, is scaling up fivefold and taking local brews national. The sector is recovering, but without tax relief, this rebound may not last.
Three months on from our last report and the picture is no better. If anything, the violence has grown more brazen and more widespread. In the northeast, Boko Haram and ISWAP have delivered some of their deadliest attacks in years. On 17th May, militants killed 23 farmers and fishermen in Borno. Barely a month later, a female suicide bomber hit Konduga’s fish market, killing 24. The message is clear – they can still strike soft targets at will.
The southeast is no safer. On 10th May, gunmen ambushed travellers on the Okigwe–Owerri highway, killing 30 and torching more than 20 vehicles. No claim of responsibility but all signs point to IPOB/ESN. This isn’t just an insurgency problem – it’s a national one.
In the Middle Belt, violence has hit a new scale. The 13/14th June massacre in Benue’s Yelwata killed between 100 and 200 people, many of them IDPs sheltering at a Catholic mission. Thousands more were displaced. Farmer–herder clashes have tipped into outright slaughter.
The northwest remains a kidnapping free-for-all. In July, bandits in Zamfara killed nine and abducted dozens. Two weeks later, they executed 38 captives despite ransom payments. On 6th August, another 45 women and children were taken in overnight raids. The kidnap-for-ransom economy is not just alive – it is thriving.
And now there’s a new front. On 1st July in Sokoto, IS-linked Lakurawa militants stormed Kwallajiya village mid-prayers, killing at least 15. This isn’t just a banditry problem anymore – the jihadist footprint is spreading westward.
Even religious leaders are being hunted. On 1st June, Boko Haram abducted Rev. Alphonsus Afina in Borno during a checkpoint ambush with RPG fire. When the clergy are no longer safe, communities lose not just security but morale.
The bottom line? The geography of violence is widening, the actors are multiplying and state responses remain slow, fragmented and largely reactive. Without a decisive shift in strategy – one that fuses security with political and economic levers – the coming months are more likely to bring escalation than relief as we see no shift in sight.
Tinubu’s government is moving on multiple fronts – trade diversification, cultural diplomacy, regional leadership, infrastructure finance – but each is a race against the same execution traps. The economics may look steadier, yet debt service, oil price fragility and FX strain are hard limits. Security is still sliding, with violence spreading faster than the state can respond. And as ties with the US cool, Abuja will have to work harder – and spend more political capital – to keep both Western and Southern partners engaged. The next quarter will be decisive. Without rapid delivery and a shift from reactive to proactive security, Nigeria risks entering 2026 with higher debt, weaker investor trust, fewer allies and an even broader map of insecurity. The window to turn this flurry of deals into real gains is open – but narrowing fast.