The Iran–Israel conflict that erupted on 13 June saw Israel launch airstrikes on Iranian nuclear and military sites, killing key scientists and commanders. Iran retaliated with hundreds of ballistic missiles targeting Israeli cities, escalating into a multi-day exchange. The US intervened on 22 June with bunker-buster strikes on major Iranian nuclear facilities, and a ceasefire was announced by Trump two days later after Iran attacked the US Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. The war caused humanitarian damage: hundreds were killed and thousands injured in Iran, with 100,000s displaced, mainly from Tehran. Israel and the US carried 100s of airstrikes on Iranian soil, while Iran launched over 1,000 missiles and drones, striking key Israeli cities and infrastructure – though 90% were intercepted.
US bombs Iran & retaliation against Al Udeid. On June 23, 2025, Iran launched a retaliatory ballistic missile strike on the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, following American attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. While most missiles were intercepted by U.S. and Qatari defences, one struck the base, damaging a CENTCOM communications hub. Satellite imagery confirmed a successful impact, but showed no other significant damage, and no casualties were reported. The international consensus was that this was a performative Iranian action. President Trump dismissed the attack as weak and chose not to respond militarily. A Trump-imposed ceasefire was declared immediately afterward and remains in place.
Netanyahu confirms that it’s not the end. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that while Israel has made significant progress in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the broader confrontation with the Islamic Republic is far from over. He warned that Iran continues to pursue weapons of mass destruction and intercontinental missiles capable of reaching the US, including Mar-a-Lago. Netanyahu credited both Israeli efforts and a recent US strike for severely damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, which he believes could trigger political change within Iran.
Extent of damage at Iranian sites. Recent satellite imagery and analysis show no signs that Iran is attempting to recover enriched uranium from the bomb-damaged Isfahan nuclear complex. All entrances to key underground tunnels remain blocked, with no evidence of excavation or equipment on site, suggesting Iran has made no move to retrieve the estimated 400 kilograms of 60% enriched uranium stored there. This aligns with Israeli intelligence confirming the uranium was neither relocated before nor moved after recent US airstrikes. The scale of destruction, visible in satellite imagery, would make any recovery difficult and highly visible. Furthermore, Iran has expelled IAEA inspectors, cutting off international oversight and accusing the agency of leaking information, while any future nuclear coordination will now be handled by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The damage at the underground Fordow nuclear site is harder to assess, although some analysis indicated that fissile material was being relocated form the site prior to the US strikes.
Regime stability. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s reappearance after weeks of absence sparked speculation about internal power struggles and potential retribution against reformist figures who may have maneuverer for succession in his absence. Reports suggest former President Hassan Rouhani and Hassan Khomeini (grandson of the first Supreme Leader) sought support from senior clerics in Qom during the Iran-Israel conflict, raising suspicions of political opportunism. Given Iran’s emphasis on religious lineage, Rouhani’s lack of status may hinder his legitimacy compared to Khomeini, a cleric. Allegations of coup attempts and factional rivalries—pitting reformists against IRGC-backed conservatives—have intensified. Critics accuse reformists of exploiting recent crises to regain influence by presenting themselves as defenders of Iran, fuelling public cynicism and backlash.
An IRGC-linked media outlet, Fars News Agency, called for mass executions of detainees accused of collaborating with Israel or Western intelligence, invoking the 1988 mass killings of political prisoners as a model. The editorial framed these executions as a necessary and justified response to alleged foreign-backed violence that resulted in Iranian civilian deaths, and defended the 1988 purges as a “brilliant chapter” in Iran’s counterterrorism history. The call comes amid a renewed crackdown, with over 700 people reportedly arrested and new emergency laws enabling wartime-style prosecutions. Fars also praised late President Raisi’s role in the 1988 killings, portraying him as a defender of national security. Despite the editorial’s severity and its chilling historical allusions, no Iranian officials have publicly responded or distanced themselves from the statements, highlighting ongoing state endorsement—or at least tolerance—of such hardline rhetoric.
Iran goes on a US (charm) offensive. Former Fox News host Tucker Carlson interview Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on 7 July. The interview was a strategic propaganda win for Tehran. The uncritical format gave Iran rare global visibility and direct access to Donald Trump’s political base, allowing Pezeshkian to frame Iran’s narrative—such as alleging Israeli assassination attempts and blaming US–Iran tensions on Israeli manipulation—without journalistic pushback. Analysts argue this reinforced Tehran’s long-term goal of driving a wedge between the US and Israel and appealing to MAGA-aligned isolationists by echoing anti-interventionist rhetoric and softening hostile slogans. While Iranian moderates praised the outreach, hardliners criticized Pezeshkian for perceived appeasement. Carlson did not challenge Iran on key issues like human rights, nuclear ambitions, or attacks on American interests.
And anger at Moscow. Tehran is increasingly disillusioned with Russia’s muted stance during the conflict, and failure to deliver long-promised military aid. Iranian frustration spiked after President Putin dismissed the idea of military assistance and as news broke of Russia offering advanced fighter jets and co-production deals to India—a US ally—while withholding similar assets from Iran. Iranian officials and analysts have openly questioned Russia’s loyalty, pointing to the imbalance in their partnership, particularly as Iran provided drones for Russia’s war in Ukraine but received minimal returns. The stalled Su-35 fighter jet deal has become a focal point of resentment, with only two jets partially delivered and no evidence of their deployment during the conflict. Despite Tehran’s outreach, including a high-level visit to Moscow, Russia’s response was limited to diplomatic gestures and offers unrelated to critical defense needs, underscoring the perceived one-sidedness of the alliance.
Short-term macroeconomic effect of conflict. Iran’s trade and oil revenues sharply declined amid the conflict, with June 2025 non-oil exports falling 34% year-on-year and imports dropping 17%, contradicting official claims of market stability. Crude oil exports to China also shrank by 16%, with further reductions noted in Q2. First-quarter data shows non-oil exports down 14%, oil exports down 17%, and a 13% decline in global oil prices, resulting in a roughly 30% drop in oil revenue. Government assertions about increased essential goods clearance appear inconsistent with the broader trade data. Long-term revenue losses are compounded by sanctions, discounted oil sales to China, and reliance on evasive tactics like ghost fleet tankers. Between 2019 and 2024, Iran earned just $160 billion from oil exports – over 60% less than the $400+ billion it made from 2013 to 2018.
Internet blackout consequences. A widespread internet blackout that began on 6 July severely disrupted connectivity across Iran, with access still affected days after the ceasefire. While framed by authorities as a national security measure, the outage has triggered accusations of selective censorship, especially as government-linked accounts remained active. The economic fallout appears significant, with estimated losses of $1.5 million per hour and over 400,000 small businesses – many reliant on digital platforms – at risk. Young Iranians, who make up most of the population, are particularly affected, with many freelancers and tech professionals considering emigration. Risky alternatives like Starlink are being explored, and domestic apps have failed to gain user trust due to poor functionality and privacy concerns. Fears of a tiered “digital apartheid” are rising, and business leaders warn the blackout could irreparably damage Iran’s innovation ecosystem and global connectivity.
Cyber hostilities continue. Despite the ceasefire, cyber hostilities have intensified significantly, with hundreds of digital attacks now taking place weekly. Pro-Iranian hacker groups have launched nearly 450 cyberattacks on Israeli entities since the truce, mostly targeting small to mid-sized businesses, resulting in data breaches and system disruptions. In contrast, Israeli-linked cyber operations, though fewer, have been more sophisticated and targeted, focusing on Iran’s financial infrastructure, including high-profile breaches of Bank Sepah and cryptocurrency exchange Nobitex. This escalating digital warfare represents a new phase of conflict where critical systems are increasingly vulnerable, and the absence of physical violence does not equate to security. Israel reportedly maintains an upper hand in cyber capabilities, using precise strikes to signal Iran’s exposure and deterrence limitations.
The visibleconfrontation with Israel is paused, but not over; hostilities will recommence if or when the nuclear programme is restarted, which is inevitable. Israel may not return immediately to aerial attacks – its significant intelligence capabilities, and ability to act, inside Iran mean that it has a spectrum of options. Although a shallow foreign policy ‘win’ for Trump in the short term, his intervention in the conflict has not alerted the fundamental dynamics. As always, expect Iranian procrastination and don’t bet on a deal.
Published 14th July 2025