Iran’s political and economic landscape is deteriorating into another turbulent new phase with UN sanctions snapping back and the rial falling even to new historic lows. As usual, Tehran is tightening restrictions at home and projecting defiance abroad. With Europe upping the pressure through multilateral channels, Iran is digging in – rejecting nuclear limits, arguing with Moscow, and widening its cyber reach. Tentative financial reforms suggest a reluctant acknowledgment that years of economic defiance haven’t paid off, but passage of anti-terrorism financing through the Majlis is genuine progress in a long-term controversial policy area.
Snapback. The United Nations officially reinstated all sanctions on Iran that had been suspended under the 2015 JCPOA, following the UK, France, and Germany’s (‘E3’) decision in August to trigger the snapback mechanism. Six Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 & 2010 come back into force (UNSRs 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and 1929). These impose arms embargoes, travel bans, asset freezes, and bans on nuclear or missile-related technology transfers. For example, Resolution 1929 (2010) bars Iran from investing abroad in sensitive industries, restricts access to global financial systems, and limits shipping and insurance for energy exports. The E3 cited Iran’s continuing violations of enrichment limits and obstruction of IAEA inspections. European patience with Tehran’s non-compliance had simply reached its limit.
Snapback marks a shift in how the international community is now approaching Iran, moving away from conditional diplomacy and back to containment. Unlike unilateral varieties, UN sanctions require enforcement by all member states, including China and Russia (hitherto key economic partners for Iran). Finance, insurance and shippers must now withdraw from any Iran-linked ventures, meaning extra difficulties for Tehran’s ability to export oil, secure investment and trade with others. Economic fallout will be immediate and acute: fuel shortages; further long-term currency depreciation (see Economic); and, upwards inflation will deepen Iran’s fiscal crisis, already strained by years of sanctions and mismanagement. Public finances will be squeezed, and popular discontent increase within Iran’s already fragile domestic landscape.
Snapback sees US and European Iran policy coming back into sync, after divergence since Donald Trump withdrew from JCPOA in 2018. The move will be welcome in Gulf states and by Israel, as both see renewed UN sanctions as a stabilizing deterrent, but raises the risk of Iranian retaliation through asymmetric means, including cyber operations, maritime harassment in the Strait of Hormuz, or intensified proxy activity across the Middle East. Tehran will use nuclear advancement as leverage and deepen tactical cooperation with Moscow and Beijing to offset isolation.
Clause and effect. Iran declared that it will no longer observe any restrictions under JCPOA following its formal expiration on October 18. In a letter to the UN secretary-general and the president of the Security Council, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said the end of the deal’s associated resolution was fully in line with its provisions, rejecting the European move to reimpose UN sanctions through the snapback mechanism. He insisted that Iran had acted in good faith, and that it was the US that had violated international law by withdrawing in 2018 and reinstating unilateral sanctions. Araghchi accused the UK, France, and Germany of failing to meet their commitments and adopting “unlawful measures”. Their decision over the summer to restore sanctions was he said, “unilateral, arbitrary, and devoid of legal or political basis.”
This position was repeated by Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei, who claimed that “no decision” had been taken within the Security Council to bring back previously lifted resolutions, citing opposition from Russia, China, and others. Moscow also rejected Western efforts to revive sanctions, calling them “legally null and void” and insisting that with the expiry of Resolution 2231, Iran’s nuclear activities should now be treated like those of any other Non-Proliferation Treaty member. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated that the snapback clause was a “legal trap,” but emphasized that Russia remained committed to diplomacy and a negotiated settlement to ease tensions over Iran’s nuclear program.
Arm’s length ally. Former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif (whose reputation internally and externally had much riding on JCPOA) accused Russia of pursuing a strategy aimed at preventing the Islamic Republic from establishing normal relations with the international community. Speaking at a conference in Tehran, he said Moscow’s policy toward Iran has two “red lines”: first, that Iran must never enjoy regular global relationships; second, that Iran should be kept away from direct confrontation. Zarif responded directly to remarks by Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister, who had earlier claimed that the snapback clause was Zarif’s invention and described it as a “legal trap” for Tehran. Zarif countered that the snapback mechanism was included in the final negotiation phase only after Russia and France had proposed even worse alternatives for Iran; it was adopted to remove the ability of any one country to veto the return of sanctions. He also accused Moscow of leaking intelligence about Iranian military and diplomatic movements – such as visits by Qassem Soleimani and Iranian drone shipments to Russia – and suggested Russia’s aim was to keep Iran in a state of diplomatic isolation.
Veil of control. Iran will mobilise 80,000 trained volunteers in Tehran Province to support social and religious outreach programmes. This will include coordination of a new “hijab and public behaviour” campaign. Rouhollah Momen-Nasab, head of Tehran’s Headquarters for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, said these personnel will drive major transformations in the province “even before relying on large state budgets.” He said the creation of a “chastity and hijab situation-room” involving cultural and executive bodies and extended an invitation to citizens to join a network of local observers to aid the promotion of social discipline and religious values. This will also see the headquarters coordinate with the prosecutor’s office and cyber-police to monitor online platforms and streaming services, warning that “virtual spaces must not be safe havens for law-breakers.” Though surveys in showed more than 70 % of Iranian men and women opposed compulsory hijab, Tehran’s leadership regards enforcement of hijab laws as a pillar of its political legitimacy.
Rial. The rial fell on 29 September following the sanctions snapback to a black-market rate of 1,170,000 IRR to the USD. This is another new all-time low. It marginally recovered to 1,070,000 by the end of the reporting period.
Banking on sovereignty. TheMajlis passed a law to President Pezeshkian approving the country’s conditional accession to the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The legislation, endorsed under Article 123 of Iran’s constitution, limits implementation to the boundaries of national laws and the constitution. The measure aims to align Iran’s financial framework with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards on countering money-laundering and terror financing. The Expediency Council approved the accession with two safeguards: Iran’s obligations must remain subject to domestic law, and that national legislation will override any conflicting provisions. The decision follows a failed hardliner attempt to block accession, with 150 lawmakers rejecting the motion. Supporters believe it could pave the way for Iran’s banking sector to reconnect with the global system and ease trade restrictions. This is true but accession is only a necessary first step; the far bigger job of reforming and modernising the banking system remains stalled. Opponents correctly fear it will expose financial channels used to circumvent sanctions and lead to Iranian banks sanctioning regime members themselves. Expediency Council member Mohammad-Mehdi Shahriari said the government acted with the Supreme Leader’s consent after extensive inter-institutional review. Shahriari warned that further delays would deepen economic isolation, noting that even Russia and China had urged Tehran to comply with global financial rules to facilitate trade.
Recognition for rural Iran. The United Nations World Tourism Organization recognized three Iranian villages among the world’s 52 best tourism destinations for 2025, citing their cultural richness and natural diversity. The sites – Shafiabad in Kerman Province, Kandolus in Mazandaran, and Soheili on Qeshm Island – symbolize Iran’s geographical breadth, from desert landscapes to lush forests and coastal ecosystems. Shafiabad, on the edge of the Lut Desert, is known for its Qajar-era caravanserai and the dramatic “kaluts,” wind-sculpted sand formations. Kandolus, in the Alborz Mountains, stands out for its ancient heritage, traditional architecture, and handicrafts. Soheili, meanwhile, has earned recognition for its eco-tourism initiatives and community-led conservation of the Hara Mangrove Forests, promoting sustainable practices such as quiet boating and local hospitality. Iran’s historical and natural heritage is almost unique; sadly, while the fall in the rial makes Iran probably the best-value tourist destination in the world, politics will continue to subdue its appeal to outsiders.
Firewalls. Microsoft has warned that Iranian cyber units are widening their focus beyond the Middle East, targeting more firms across Europe and North America. The company’s latest threat report links three Tehran-backed hacker groups to a string of intrusions into shipping and logistics networks; all efforts that appear designed to gain lasting access to sensitive data and potentially disrupt global maritime trade.
As Iran heads into winter, the convergence of renewed sanctions, a weakening currency, and domestic unrest will test the government’s resilience. Again. It will want to project strength – through aggressive regional moves, tighter internal control, and defiant rhetoric – but its strategic bandwidth is narrowing. Mounting economic and social pressure may force some minor concessions, but a substantive shift in policy or posture remains unlikely in the near term.