Iran faces a volatile remainder of the month, balancing tentative nuclear cooperation with the IAEA against domestic opposition and the looming threat of UN snapback sanctions. Hardliners decry the deal made in Cairo, while moderates warn of systemic collapse without urgent reform. At the same time, oil exports to China surge, the rial stabilises slightly and Washington intensifies sanctions enforcement. Regional tensions remain high, with Israeli strikes on Hamas in Qatar reminding Tehran that its principal foe remains wholly unconstrained.
A. New inspection deal agreed – maybe.
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi announced on 10 September that a new agreement with Iran – formalised in Cairo – will apply to all of Iran’s declared nuclear facilities, including those damaged in the Israeli and US airstrikes in June. The deal establishes procedures for inspections, notifications, and reporting, and requires Iran to provide data on the attacked sites, especially concerning any nuclear material present. Grossi welcomed Iran’s stated willingness to remain within the NPT and cooperate technically, but emphasised that restoring oversight will be complex. The framework must still operate under Iran’s legal rights and obligations pursuant to the NPT safeguards agreement.The deal is on shaky ground. A recently passed Majlis law suspended cooperation with the IAEA, creating a clear risk of non-compliance. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has already walked back the scope, saying only the Bushehr Power Plant has access for now, and that further inspections depend on a halt to “hostile actions against Iran.” In practice, inspector access may remain blocked – making this more about optics than substance.
B. Domestic disharmony.
The Iranian parliament convened an emergency session to examine the new agreement. Over 60 MPs demanded clarification from Araghchi and the Supreme National Security Council, questioning whether the deal violates existing suspension legislation. Hardliners branded the agreement “cursed,” warned that Iran should quit the NPT if UN sanctions return, and described Grossi as a “Mossad agent.”Despite this, former nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi described the agreement as positive, though he warned the diplomatic window was closing. Araghchi defended the deal, insisting it safeguards Iran’s interests, does not breach parliament’s law, and currently grants no inspector access. He stressed that any future monitoring would require approval from the Supreme National Security Council. The debate plays out as France, Germany, and the UK trigger the UN’s snapback sanctions mechanism, which could restore sanctions by the end of September unless Iran reopens access.
C. Battle damage assessment.
Israeli intelligence sources told French officials that Iran’s nuclear programme was not fully destroyed by the June strikes. While many facilities and centrifuge sites were damaged, enough equipment remains to revive parts of the programme over time. Araghchi has now confirmed that stockpiles of highly enriched uranium remain buried under rubble at damaged sites — the first such acknowledgement from Tehran.
D. Moderates speak out.
Voices from Tehran’s moderate camp are warning that the system is running out of time to enact meaningful reforms. Figures such as academic Hadi Khaniki, historian Hashem Aghajari, and former minister Abbas Akhoundi argue that sanctions, economic mismanagement, shortages and inequality had already eroded trust long before the war with Israel. They stress that the recent surge in patriotic unity is temporary.Aghajari has called for a reformation of Shiism’s political role, warning against the clerical monopoly of Velayat-e Faqih. Akhoundi emphasises weak democratic mandates and low turnout. Moderates outline three paths forward: strike a deal with the West, escalate to force a resolution, or maintain inertia – which they describe as “a suspension within a suspension.” They warn the opportunity for change is measured in months, not years.
E. Rial.
The rial fluctuated on news of the inspection deal but strengthened modestly in September to 985,000 IRR to the dollar. The move is symbolically important: slipping back through the one-million line would carry a strong psychological weight, signalling renewed crisis.
F. Crude exports.
Exports to China have surged. August discharges hit 1.68m bpd, up 23% from July, while floating storage fell from 30m barrels in early August to 15m by early September. Over the first eight months of 2025, China averaged 1.45m bpd of Iranian crude, slightly above last year. Beijing’s purchases are driven by discounts but also reflect broader geopolitical positioning — resisting US sanctions norms as trade friction with Washington grows. Russia has encouraged this line, seeing Iranian oil as a shared lever against Western pressure.
G. US sanctions response.
Washington has intensified enforcement. The State Department offered up to USD 15m for information on IRGC financial networks, naming Chinese and Omani intermediaries. The Justice Department has charged Omani trader Mahmood Rashid Amur al Habsi and his associates with laundering proceeds from sanctioned crude. An arrest warrant has been issued. The move underscores Washington’s intent to hit facilitators, not just Iranian actors.
H. Capital gains tax reform.
Parliament has passed a new law imposing capital gains taxes on real estate, vehicles, foreign currency, metals, and cryptocurrencies. Half of inflation-driven gains are now taxable. With inflation averaging over 42% annually since 2020, many Iranians had relied on such assets to preserve value. The measure deepens public frustration and could inflame social discontent.
I. Iran extends offer of security guarantees.
A lawmaker, Mojtaba Zarei, proposed that Qatar expel US forces and host IRGC hypersonic missiles. The move followed an Israeli strike in Doha that killed a Qatari officer and Hamas members. Tehran condemned the attack, while President Masoud Pezeshkian called it “illegal, inhumane and anti-peace.” Larijani urged regional states to prepare for Iran’s “upcoming dominance.”
The rhetoric is significant: Qatar hosts the US Al Udeid Air Base, and Tehran itself has violated Qatari sovereignty in the past. Beyond Qatar, Gulf maritime disruption and proxy escalation via Hezbollah or the Houthis remain highly plausible retaliation channels if snapback sanctions proceed.
The coming weeks will test whether Tehran can turn the Cairo deal into genuine engagement or slide further into confrontation. Much depends on whether IAEA inspectors are allowed back into key sites, if Iran shares credible data on enriched uranium stockpiles, and if the Supreme National Security Council authorises access despite parliamentary resistance.
Internationally, the late-September snapback deadline looms large, with Europe and the US pressing for verifiable steps while Russia and China weigh how far to shield Tehran. Beyond that, the larger risk is Tehran stepping away not only from the JCPOA but from the NPT itself — moving closer to declared nuclear threshold status. The window for choice is narrowing fast, with reform, escalation, or drift each carrying profound risks for Iran’s stability.