In our recent article “WWIII? Let’s All Just Calm Down, Shall We?” we debunked the media’s histrionic narrative that WWIII is imminent and inevitable, and explained the geopolitical context behind today’s global instability … and the likelihood that the planet will resettle in coming years.
At the centre of the media’s shrill WWIII predictions stemming from this conflict is a highly unrealistic narrative that, after Russia’s done absorbing Ukraine, she’ll then march right across Europe, bob across the Channel, and be in Westminster before you know it. There’s a good reason that this narrative is out there – it suits Ukraine very, very well to have Europeans and North Americans imagining it could be true. If we can be made to believe it, then there’s all the more reason to keep funneling funds and arms to Ukraine to help them push those mean Russians back, and ensure that they never get past Ukraine and into the rest of Europe.
Don’t get us wrong; we fully, fully support Ukraine in its fight to push Russia out of its sovereign territory and yes, we certainly should continue to funnel arms and funds to brave Ukraine. Indeed, as CIA Director Bill Burns said in January 2024, cutting off support to Ukraine would be an “own goal of historic proportions”. Yet, we must recognize this narrative for what it is; propaganda with a clear purpose behind it.
The narrative is unrealistic for two key reasons; first, the true reason behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and second, the reality of Russian military capabilities:
First then, and we want to be very clear about this, Russia did not invade Ukraine as a precursor to gallivanting through the rest of Europe on her way to the Atlantic. She invaded so that she could rebuild the strategic depth around the Russian heartland that Ukraine had previously provided before the 2014 Euromaidan revolution. Until 2014 Ukraine had been pretty much a carbon-copy of Belarus; a Russia-leaning puppet state that provided a security blanket of territory and time between NATO militaries and the Russian heartland. This continual desire for strategic depth is a crucial, central aspect to understand about Russia and the Russian psyche, and once you comprehend the concept, and appreciate the influence of Russia’s geography, this will make everything about Russia’s actions in Ukraine, Chechnya, Georgia, and Belarus much, much clearer. We explain it in depth in our article “Russia Has Not ‘Changed The World’ – Putin Doesn’t Deserve Such Credit”.
Second, Russia’s military record in Ukraine so far has been woeful. Remembering the intent to seize strategic depth, now consider what she has achieved to date through this invasion; she has failed to seize the entirety of Ukraine, she has failed to even seize half of it along with Kyiv, and she has failed to even seize the natural defensive line of the Dnieper River. Russia has miserably failed in her war aims. Indeed, she has failed so miserably that all she has managed to seize is a handful of oblasts that don’t even connect up with Belarus, her puppet state ‘ally’ whom offers a strategic depth buffer of her own; any army headed for Moscow could still drive straight between Belarus and the oblasts that Russia holds in Ukraine. So, Russia has not achieved any strategic depth whatsoever. Indeed, this has even been skillfully proven by the Ukrainians with their own incursion in Kursk oblast; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led to enemy troops being closer to her heartland, not further from it.
So, is Russia going to spark WWIII by taking all of Ukraine and then directly attacking a NATO member like Poland as it attempts to gobble up every nation between Moscow and the Atlantic? No, that’s not remotely what she is trying to achieve with her invasion of Ukraine, and indeed (as we explored in our article “Thinking The Unthinkable – Why Talk Of Resuming UK Conscription Is Not What It Seems”) attacking a NATO member would actually put the heartland that she is trying so hard to protect at more risk, not less.
Recent Developments
Nor should we take so much significance from two recent developments in this conflict; the deployment of North Korean forces to bolster Russia’s efforts, and the authorization for Ukraine to use NATO made weapons to strike inside Russia.
Firstly, up until now Russia was essentially alone (if we ignore a handful of Iranians and their drones) in the slugging match with Ukraine. Ukraine, on the other hand, has not been alone – her troops are trained in NATO countries, her weapons and munitions are (largely) manufactured in NATO countries, and her citizens have been welcomed into European homes. Yet, for some reason now that North Korea has sent a handful of troops (estimates range from 8000 to 13,000 – roughly a Brigade) to join Russian troops in yet more ill-conceived mass attacks on Ukrainian positions this conflict has supposedly taken on an even more sinister tone. Why?
It seems as if many have taken this collaboration to signal the beginning of some form of Samuel P. Huntington-esque Clash of Civilisations where the Russians, North Koreans and friends begin a worldwide hot conflict against their ideological opposites in Ukraine, Europe, North America and the democracy-loving states of the world. If that were the case we’d have divisions (formations of 20K plus troops) of Chinese, Iranians, Venezuelans and so on joining in the fight, and satellite conflicts springing up around the world too. Instead, we have a paltry few thousand North Korean infantrymen (noting that a significant proportion of the North Korean brigade’s troops won’t be frontline fighting soldiers) along with highly dated self-propelled artillery pieces that are little more than fresh targets for Ukrainian drones and missiles, and which only contribute to Russia’s logistical headaches given they fire a calibre of ammunition not made in Russian factories. The North Korean deployment is really not all that significant, therefore, and if anything is instead a sign of desperation – Russia is scrabbling around for manpower to send to Ukraine, as above hasn’t achieved any of her strategic objectives, and is gasping for options to save herself from humiliation.
That said, as we discussed in our article “Thinking The Unthinkable – Why Talk Of Resuming UK Conscription Is Not What It Seems”, we do see a hardening global divergence between the ideological East and ideological West, and we do see that leading to conflict on some level at some point – but we are far less convinced that that conflict will be the ‘hot’ WWIII war that so many pundits are predicting. Perhaps, in this context, competition is a better word than conflict, and if we can attach that term to it then it is clear that such a competition has already begun.
Secondly, ATACMS and Storm Shadows. Putin has talked of red line after red line for the duration of this conflict, and surprisingly enough those red lines have proven time and again to be nothing more than a bluff. That the US has now authorized Ukraine to use ATACMS missiles, and the British have also approved (having been given US approval) the use of Storm Shadows, to strike into Russia proper, is also really not all that significant. Ukraine has been using its own homemade weapons to strike into Russia for a considerable period already, and as mentioned above it now even has troops inside Russia. Russia, on the other hand, has routinely fired missiles and drones from inside its territory into Ukraine (some of which, on occasion, have landed inside the territory of NATO states). So, what is the difference and what is the real significance? Not a great deal.
So, what will Putin do in response? So far he has fired a new intermediate-range hypersonic ballistic missile called ‘Oreshnik’ into Ukraine. This isn’t the first hypersonic missile to be used by Russia against Ukraine, but it differs in that, like an intercontinental ballistic missile, it can drop multiple (six in the Oreshnik’s case) independently targetable warheads from one missile body. Its high speed (supposedly Mach 10) and upper atmosphere flight path make it very hard for Ukraine’s air defences to detect and shoot down. Yet, in military terms, for Ukraine this is not all that significant – yes, it can do a lot of damage (although the recent strikes by this weapon did not wreak as much as you might imagine – allegedly because this demonstration did not include High Explosive in the warheads), but really the same effect could be achieved by launching volleys of other hard-to-intercept hypersonic missiles. Yes, it is nuclear capable – but so were many of the other missiles that have been fired into Ukraine over the last few years, such as the air-launched hypersonic Kh-47M2 Kinzhal. In political terms, yes, it does constitute a threat of sorts and no doubt this was Putin’s main aim in launching it; the Oreshnik is capable of reaching London, but then we have known throughout this war, and indeed for decades, that Russia possesses missiles that are nuclear capable and can reach London, New York, and Washington. Plus, Russia doesn’t have a lot of Oreshniks right now – they’re still at experimental stage. So, does this change the price of fish? Not really.
What else? Aleksandr Lukashenko, Putin’s puppet President of Belarus, has mused that Putin would take the use of ATACMS and Storm Shadows to strike into Russia as meaning that it would now be proportionate to conduct strikes on the assets and facilities of those NATO nations that are supplying the weapons being used to strike into Russia – so attacks on US or British military bases or ships. But again, to do so would be to directly target NATO, and invite more risk to the Russian heartland, which is exactly against his original war aims. Instead, Lukashenko suggested that Putin might arm proxy groups, such as the Houthis of Yemen, with Russian weapons and allow them to target US or British bases or ships on Russia’s behalf. This is hardly a significant response, and certainly isn’t escalatory towards WWIII; Iran’s been doing it for years already.
The Houthis have been targeting shipping in the Bab el Mandeb strait for a long while, and most commercial shipping has now rerouted around Africa to avoid them – so the need for a significant naval presence in the Red Sea is diminishing anyway. They’ve also had Iranian drones and ballistic missiles for years and have used them, to not great effect, to strike at Saudi Arabia and Israel – so there’s nothing new or particularly escalatory about giving the Houthis more weapons (even if they are a tad more sophisticated than Iran’s). This is especially true when we consider that UK or US bases in the Middle East are sufficiently equipped with air defence capabilities already. It isn’t as if the UK and US have not already anticipated the possibility of missile or drone strikes on their bases – they have been warily watching for Iran to try such for several years already. Nor is Russia likely to be able (or willing) to supply Oreshniks to the Houthis – they just don’t have enough to be sharing them around.
All in all, what these factors do suggest is perhaps two key things; that firstly Russia is hurting – she has failed to achieve her objectives, is scrabbling about for resources, bluffs constantly, and Ukraine has now (finally) been given the power to fully strike back, rather than fight with one arm behind her back. Secondly, that time is a key factor; as we have already said repeatedly, the most influential factor influencing the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine would be the outcome of the US Presidential election in November 2024. Now, with Donald Trump’s re-election there’s a glimmer of hope for Putin and Russia. If Putin and his troops can hang on for just a little bit longer, and maybe seize a few more chips to negotiate with, then there will be opportunity to hash out the kind of “deal” that Trump is so fond of talking about.
That said, Ukraine and Zelenskyy aren’t blind to this deal-making scenario either; holding a chunk of Russia’s Kursk oblast is a useful bargaining chip, as are the options to join, or conversely to offer not to seek to join, NATO and/ or the EU.
So, let’s all just calm down, shall we?