Somalia now sits at the intersection of three strategic systems: the Nile basin, the Red Sea corridor and the Middle East security competition. That alone should make it one of the most geopolitically sensitive territories in Africa. It rarely gets treated that way.
The Red Sea carries a large share of global trade. The Bab al Mandab remains one of its most fragile choke points. The Suez Canal depends on its stability. The Nile underpins Egypt’s economic and political survival. And Gulf, Turkish and Israeli influence is pushing steadily deeper into the Horn of Africa.
Somalia sits where all of those pressures meet.
For decades, Somalia has been framed as an humanitarian tragedy and a counterterrorism problem. A country defined by what it lacks, not by what it shapes. We have treated it as a fragile state, a development challenge, a security liability.
That lens no longer holds.
Somalia is no longer just absorbing instability. It is beginning to generate geopolitical consequences.
Somalia is no longer just a place where instability lingers. It is becoming a place where other people’s power games collide. And the states that understand this first will shape the next phase of Red Sea, Nile and Horn of Africa geopolitics.
Egypt already does.
Cairo’s recent diplomatic and military alignment with Mogadishu is not about sympathy. It is about strategy. By publicly defending Somalia’s sovereignty and formalising defence cooperation, Egypt has moved from distant advocate to operational stakeholder. This is not symbolic diplomacy. It is a forward deployment of influence.
Somalia has become the forward edge of Egypt’s Nile security doctrine.
The timing is not accidental. The African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) is winding down, to be replaced by a new security architecture under AUSSOM. The old regional security order, once dominated by Ethiopian and Kenyan influence, is loosening. A vacuum is emerging. Cairo is moving to shape what fills it.
This shift only makes sense when viewed through Ethiopia.
Addis Ababa’s Somaliland port agreement was not merely a commercial infrastructure deal. It was a strategic signal. Ethiopia is no longer content to be a landlocked Nile upstream power. It now seeks maritime presence, regional leverage and political optionality along the Red Sea corridor. That ambition is underpinned by Emirati investment in Berbera Port, which has quietly provided the infrastructure reality behind Ethiopia’s diplomatic confidence.
For Cairo, this is a red line. Nile politics do not stop at water flow. They now extend to ports, shipping lanes and external alignments.
Somalia is where those threads converge. And that convergence is now playing out inside Somalia itself.
Somalia has just blown up its relationship with the UAE. Mogadishu has scrapped its agreements with Abu Dhabi and accused it of quietly backing moves that weaken Somali sovereignty after the latest recognition of Somaliland. Puntland and Jubaland, meanwhile, have done the opposite. They have made it clear they will keep working with the UAE, regardless of what the federal government wants.
This is not administrative fallout. It is Somalia arguing with itself in public.
But Somalia is not a unitary chess piece.
Mogadishu does not speak for the entire country. Federal member states such as Puntland and Jubaland maintain their own political calculations, security relationships and economic alignments. External powers are acutely aware of this. Influence in Somalia is often exercised not only through the federal government, but through sub-national channels that allow competing patrons to hedge their bets.
Sovereignty becomes negotiated rather than consolidated.
This creates a quiet but dangerous form of proxy competition. While Mogadishu aligns more closely with Egypt, some regional authorities maintain backchannels with Ethiopia, the UAE or other Gulf actors. The centre holds, but unevenly.
In this environment, Somalia risks becoming strategically valuable before it becomes institutionally resilient.
Turkey has understood this terrain better than most. Its presence in Somalia is not limited to training or development assistance. Ankara has embedded itself deeply into Somali security architecture. More recently, it has formalised a maritime and hydrocarbon cooperation framework that authorises Turkey to assist in defending Somali waters and explore offshore energy potential.
Turkey now has a physical stake in Somali sovereignty.
This adds a resource layer to what was already a strategic competition. Somalia is no longer just about territory and alignment. It is about maritime control, energy optionality and future economic leverage.
Qatar continues to layer finance and political mediation into this ecosystem. Gulf states hedge through ports, logistics and security partnerships. Israel tests diplomatic space through emerging regional relationships. Western actors remain present, but increasingly reactive rather than directive.
And hanging over all of this is great power competition, whether Somalia wants it or not. China operates its only overseas military base next door in Djibouti. It is a major regional creditor and infrastructure financier. Russia continues to probe diplomatic and security access points across the Horn. Somalia is no longer insulated from US-China or Western-Russia strategic calculations. It is becoming entangled within them.
Somalia is no longer a vacuum. It is a convergence zone. And in every convergence zone, friction creates opportunity for spoilers.
Al Shabaab is no longer simply an insurgent group fighting the Somali state. In a crowded geopolitical arena, it becomes a systemic exploitative actor. As regional powers focus on outmanoeuvring one another, institutional seams widen. Al Shabaab historically thrives in those seams. Competition between state sponsors, overlapping security mandates and fragmented authority create precisely the environment in which insurgent groups regain relevance.
The danger is not only state-on-state rivalry. It is that rivalry generating operational blind spots.
This matters because Somalia now sits at the junction of three strategic systems.
First, the Red Sea. One of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors, already militarised and increasingly exposed to regional spillover.
Second, the Nile basin. Where upstream and downstream power politics are becoming more openly securitised.
Third, the Middle East security complex. Where Gulf, Turkish and Israeli interests increasingly project into Africa rather than stopping at its northern edge.
Somalia is where those systems now touch.
For the United States and Europe, this should not be abstract. Instability in Somalia directly affects Bab al Mandab risk, Suez traffic confidence (12% of global trade transits the Suez/ Bab el Mandab in a typical year), migration pressure and counterterrorism posture. A new proxy competition in the Horn would not remain local. It would export consequences into trade flows, refugee dynamics and maritime insurance markets.
Yet Western engagement remains largely tactical, not strategic. For Somalia, the implications are profound.
On one hand, its strategic relevance offers leverage it has never previously possessed. On the other, that relevance attracts more agendas than any fragile political system can easily manage. External guarantees may protect sovereignty rhetorically, while straining it operationally. Competing patrons may strengthen capacity in some areas while hollowing out cohesion in others.
Somalia is being pulled into a role it did not design.
For Egypt, the calculation is clear. A stable, aligned Somalia strengthens Cairo’s hand in Nile diplomacy and Red Sea risk management. For Turkey, Somalia offers long-term strategic depth in Africa. For Gulf States, it offers maritime insurance. For Ethiopia, it represents both a constraint and a prize. For Western actors, it is becoming an overlooked fault line.
What plays out in Mogadishu now echoes directly in Addis Ababa and Cairo. It shapes Red Sea security assumptions. It influences Nile bargaining power. It alters how Africa integrates into Middle East geopolitics.
If Western powers wish to avoid a multi-state proxy competition emerging in the Horn, they must move beyond tactical counter-terrorism and begin engaging with the region as a single, integrated security complex.
Somalia is no longer the story of state failure. It is the story of strategic awakening.
And when fragile states awaken geopolitically before they stabilise institutionally, the transition is rarely quiet.