We’ve been quiet of late because, well, there’s not been much more to say than what we’ve already told you. We predicted that the US and Israel would attack Iran on the very weekend they indeed did. We predicted that the US would have limited political patience/ will for the conflict, and that Trump would quickly try to craft himself an off-ramp insurance policy. We predicted that Iran would lash out at Gulf nations’ infrastructure, and close the Hormuz Strait, holding the global economy hostage and demonstrating mastery of effects-based planning. We predicted that US/ Israeli attacks on Iran would not achieve regime change nor curb nuclear weapons development. There wasn’t much else to say about this gargantuan folly. We also predicted, long ago, that Trump’s barrage of derisory comments about NATO and various allies would eventually backfire on him and the USA. And so, all of the above has come to pass. Error after error, after error after error. All of it so foreseeable, so predictable (at least to us, anyway).
So, what now? Well, we provided seven outcome scenarios for you to consider, and it only remains to be seen which of the two that we weighted most heavily are indeed the final outcome; either the continuance of the current clerical regime, or its continuance but with heavier Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) involvement going forward. Neither are ideal, but one or other is inevitable, so poorly thought through has Operation Epic Fury been.
But before this conflict fully concludes are we yet likely to see more escalation? We suspect so, unfortunately, and we also suspect that this escalation will be yet another gigantic mistake. Let us explain.
Hormuz
Through giant miscalculation the US/ Israeli attacks have resulted in the closure of the Hormuz Strait by Iran. This was always Iran’s nuclear option, and if ever the regime felt existentially threatened they were bound to resort to it. It beggars belief that Trump claimed that nobody in his team voiced a concern that this could occur. It was utterly obvious. We suspect that, since Trump has deliberately eviscerated any whiff of actual expertise from his inner circle, there was simply nobody with the basic knowledge or common sense that was within earshot of him. There are plenty of suitably knowledgeable and qualified experts within US government who could have highlighted this issue, but Trump has made utterly certain that none of them can tell him anything he dreams up is a bad idea. If General Jim Mattis, the soldier’s soldier, was still Trump’s Secretary of Defense, rather than the woefully unqualified Hegseth, you can bet your bottom dollar he’d have highlighted concerns over the Strait and this conflict would not have begun.
Nonetheless, having now kicked this hornet’s nest and provoked the closure of the Strait, Trump has an enormous problem on his hands. The price of almost everything on our planet is linked to the price of energy, and any restriction on the flow of two key energy materials – oil and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) – inevitably affects the price of everything else. Cue inflation, cue stock markets plummeting, cue higher gasoline prices, the list goes on. And if we know one thing about Trump it is that he always chickens out when stock markets tank in relation to one of his poor decisions. So, the closure of the Strait by the Iranians has proven to be a very well-aimed arrow at his Achilles heel.
How to un-bugger this situation then? Anyone with even a smidgeon of military background will be able to tell you quickly that, unless the Iranians themselves agree to cease threatening the Strait, there’s an exceedingly small likelihood that any opposing military force can secure it. We also need to remember that Iran does not need to saturate the Strait with its forces, nor with mines, nor does it need to sink every tanker that attempts to pass through. All Iran needs to do is to pose sufficient threat to shipping and insurers will prevent their insured vessels from transiting – that’s enough to shut down the Strait and strangle global energy supply. It is one thing to secure an area against the physical presence of an actor, quite another to eliminate the idea of threat.
We read a rather ridiculous post a few weeks back that proclaimed this was the death-knell for the Lloyd’s of London insurance market, because by pulling their coverage they had undermined their value and reliability to insurance policy customers worldwide. Utter poppycock, and plainly silly. Insurance is about transferring risk; when a policy is purchased it is priced based on a calculation of the risk at the time, but when an idiotic conflict suddenly causes that risk to grow exponentially, the price of the risk transfer necessarily goes up or becomes unpriceable/ unattractive to the body to which the risk would be transferred. This is just part and parcel of the insurance business, indeed war clauses are standard, and so it is definitely NOT a death-knell for Lloyd’s. Trump tried to remedy this by instructing US government bodies to offer insurance – which fell flat on its face. Firstly, there’s a good reason that that risk was being priced higher by Lloyd’s of London so the US policies would necessarily need to be priced higher too, secondly shipping owners want to know that if a vessel is sunk then they can reliably secure their payout from their insurance policy. Lloyd’s of London have hundreds of years of credibility, whereas a government that’s built on a house of cards mountain of debt, debt which is actively being sold off by both its enemies and its former friends, with a currency that is fast devaluing no less, has little credibility compared. Oh, and have you ever dealt with US government bureaucracy? If you’ve ever done a US tax return, for example, you’ll get it – now imagine claiming hundreds of millions of dollars for the sinking of your supertanker (and its cargo, and the environmental damage) from a US government body. No dice.
Military Options
So, as we can see, a military operation to eliminate the threat to shipping in the Strait, such that insurers are willing to allow tankers to transit, is going to be exceedingly difficult to achieve decisively. Nonetheless, let’s look at some practical options for how the US might go about at least trying to achieve it, despite the exceedingly small chance that it will succeed. For, we unfortunately suspect, President Trump is indeed going to attempt it – with awful results.
Coastal
If the US wants to truly secure the Strait of Hormuz from the threat of Iranian missiles and drones (as well as fast boats, submarines and sea mines) then the only foolproof way to do so would be to secure the entire Iranian coastline (and islands) bordering the Strait, and to a sufficient depth that Iranian forces could not identify shipping transiting the Strait and target them with drones or missiles fired from inland launchers. Focusing on the mainland for the moment, this means the US would need to secure not only a strip of land along the entire coast, but also any higher ground overlooking the Strait – perhaps to a good 20km of depth.
First, linear structures and positions are exceedingly difficult and costly to secure – having a long, narrow strip simply spreads out your available military resources and leaves you vulnerable to coordinated, simultaneous attacks along your lengthy front. See Normandy 1944.
Second, this would require a very significant number of troops. Iranian coastal territory bordering the Strait sits in an inverted U-shape above the Strait. The distance overland (not as the crow flies) between the Iranian coastal towns of Bandar-e-Lengeh and Bandar-e-Jask is roughly 500km. So (ignoring for the moment the island of Qeshm), to secure the entire Iranian coastline from which missiles and drones might be fired at shipping in the Strait would require the US to seize, and hold, roughly ten thousand square kilometres. That’s a little smaller than the US state of Connecticut, or two and a half times the size of Rhode Island, or roughly the size of Jamaica, or slightly smaller than Qatar – with an actively contested frontline 500km long, and a hostile population inside the controlled territory. To accomplish this would likely require hundreds and hundreds of thousands of troops just to seize the land, let alone hold it. The 1944 D-Day landings in Normandy required 133,000 seaborne troops plus 24,000 airborne troops to secure an 80km (50 mile) frontage in Normandy. If we consider more recent military operations for context, President Zelenskyy of Ukraine claimed in February 2026 that it cost Russia between 102 and 156 soldiers per square kilometre gained of Ukrainian territory. Even at the lower estimate of 102 soldiers per square kilometre we’re looking at over 1 million troops to secure 10,000 square kilometres of Iranian coastline.
And yes, this sounds silly – because that is precisely what it is, it would be just plain silly for the US to even consider trying to secure the Strait by seizing all Iranian coastline that borders the Strait. As we said above, the only way to eliminate the threat to shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz and recommence the flow of key energy supplies to the global market is for the Iranians themselves to decide to cease threatening it.
Islands
There are three islands that we want to bring to your attention. The first is Kharg. There’s been lots of speculation that the target for the US troops en route to the region is Kharg island. Maybe so, but we think this would be unwise for two key reasons. First, Secretary of War (!) Pete Hegseth doesn’t say very many sensible things, but he has consistently said one sensible thing; it is best to not tell your enemies what you are planning to do, before you do it. With so much chatter in the media concluding that the US is indeed about to invade Kharg, it would be a pretty bad idea to then go and do exactly that – it would be a gift to the Iranian defenders, and would lead to significant US casualties (which is highly politically unpalatable in the US).
Second, what exactly would be the point of taking Kharg island? Sure, it is Iran’s main oil export terminal, so controlling it would have a big impact on its economy now and in the future, but it does absolutely nothing to release the constriction of the Strait of Hormuz, which is by far the most pressing problem. Sure, it might give the US some leverage to bargain with, but do we really think that the regime will just give up the vastly more significant leverage that its stranglehold over the Strait of Hormuz provides? It really won’t.
Regards the Strait itself, Kharg is 660 kilometres from Hormuz. Iranian drones and missiles aren’t being fired into the Strait from Kharg. Sure, the island has deepwater ports for tankers and naval vessels, and an airport for fighter jets, but even if an F22 were to put on its afterburners and fly towards Hormuz at its top speed of Mach 2.25 (2414km/h) it would still take the Raptor just over 16 minutes to reach Hormuz after take-off (not counting scramble time then). So, by the time that Raptor arrives over Hormuz it’s all over; the Strait is just 24 miles/ 39km wide at its narrowest, and the slowest subsonic anti-ship missile travels at about 600mph. This means it would take an Exocet, for example, just 2.4 minutes to transit the entire width of the Strait. By the time the Raptor arrives overhead the ship has been sinking for 13+ minutes already. Sure, you could have Raptors loitering, patrolling the skies above the Strait, but that would be taking an enormous risk that a pair of F22s that cost US$350m each (total programme cost) are shot down by Iranian coastal Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs).
Conclusion – attacking Kharg is largely pointless in terms of securing the Strait/ resuming energy supplies.
The next island to discuss is Qeshm. This island is the largest in the Gulf, and flanks almost half of the Strait. Capturing this island and festooning it with air defence assets might allow the US to offer a significant buffer of protection to ships transiting the Strait. BUT, firstly Qeshm is almost 1500km squared, so you would need a very significant number of troops to capture it and then to continue to secure it against inevitable Iranian attacks across the Clarence Strait that separates Qeshm from mainland Iran. If we go by President Zelenskyy’s lower estimate figures, that’s at least 153,000 troops. There’s also about 148,000 (mainly Sunni) Iranian citizens on the island that would need to be controlled if a bloody insurgency wasn’t to follow occupation – add more troops then. And that’s before you consider the Iranian military assets and troops on Qeshm. As you’d imagine, given Qeshm’s positioning flanking the Strait, Iran has perceived its strategic significance and has built underground “missile cities” and concealed fast attack boat docks around the island, garrisoning it with thousands of troops. Zoom in on Google Maps and you’ll notice that the Iranians have built sand berms around much of the island’s seaward facing coastline, with a coast road behind the berms for rapid troop deployment and interspersed with heavy weapons emplacements. They’re ready. So, add even more invading troops to the roster.
Thing is, even were the US to secure, and hold, the entirety of Qeshm and liberally sprinkle it with air defence systems to reliably shoot down drones and missiles flying from mainland Iran towards the strait, they still would not have secured the remainder of the Strait that continues to be bordered by the Iranian mainland. This means that shipping transiting the Strait would continue to be threatened by drones and missiles emanating from the mainland. Add to this that shipping approaching the Strait could still be threatened by missiles and drones emanating from the (disputed) Iranian islands of Abu Musa, Siri, Farur, Lesser Tunb, and Greater Tunb, and we can see that Qeshm is only a fraction of the picture, not the whole.
Conclusion – capturing Qeshm is also largely pointless in terms of securing the Strait/ resuming energy supplies.
What about Greater Tunb? This island is roughly 10km squared and hosts both a port and an airfield, as well as, inevitably, a garrison. There are no more than a few hundred civilians, and the island is about 20km from Qeshm and roughly 50km from the mouth of the Strait that is bordered to the north by Hengam Island (Iranian, off Qeshm) and the Omani coast at Harf Ghabi. So, naval vessels could be based here with relatively responsive transit times into the Strait proper, and F22s could reach the mouth of the strait within one minute’s flight time at max speed (excluding scramble time). If we ignore the facts laid out above, that even were Greater Tunb to be secured, shipping (incl US Navy vessels) could still be threatened from Qeshm, the Iranian mainland, and the host of other Iranian islands in the Gulf, then Greater Tunb offers potential to be a combined naval and air base within quick reach of the Strait. It is tempting indeed, but in reality, it still does not solve the problem of the threat to shipping in the Strait.
Could US forces take Greater Tunb? Yes, we think they could. Right now, there’re about 50,000 US troops in the region, but not many of those are frontline fighting troops – the vast majority are dedicated to air defense emplacements, radar sites, aircraft support, and logistics. ~2,300 Marines are in the region, and another ~2,300 are on their way. The rapid response unit of the US’ 82nd Airborne Division have been stood up, comprising around 4000 fighting troops from the division’s 13,000 to 15,000. So, at present we’re really looking at about 8-9000 fighting troops on their way or currently in region.
The general rule of thumb is that attackers should outnumber defenders three to one. So, if the garrison of Greater Tunb numbers no more than 3000 Iranian troops, then the combined USMC and 82nd Airborne contingent would be sufficient to take them on. Note, however, that the Iranians are also well aware of the strategic significance of Greater Tunb and its port and airfield. Go ahead and zoom in on the island on Google and you will be able to see very extensive fortifications around its entire coastline; a coastal road rings the island allowing rapid deployment and repositioning. In addition to the berms we described on Qeshm, on Greater Tunb we can also see extensive trench systems, U-shaped berm areas for armoured vehicles to drive into and point their main guns out to sea, and heavy weapons emplacements dotted between the trenches. Some areas of the trench systems also have overhead cover in anticipation of bombardment, allowing the defenders to take cover inside and then emerge to continue fighting once the bombardment ceases. This, we suspect, is why the 82nd is being mobilized; whilst the USMC attempt a seaborne invasion, the 82nd can be parachuted or flown inland, likely direct onto the airfield – this splits the defenders, forcing them to face US troops both to their front and rear.
And before you think that perhaps we’re giving too much away and are unnecessarily heightening the risk to US troops – come on, do you really think that the Iranians haven’t already thought of all of this, and haven’t been alerted to US troop movements already reported in the press?
Conclusion – capturing Greater Tunb is also largely pointless in terms of securing the Strait/ resuming energy supplies.
So, what are the options?
Frankly, this pointlessness extends to the US attempting to capture any other Iranian islands or coastal sites because the Iranians will still be able to continue to threaten the Strait from a smorgasbord of other locations. The only real way to ensure unfettered resumption of global energy supplies will be for the Iranians themselves to decide to cease threatening the Strait. This situation cannot be un-buggered through military force, only negotiation. And so, as we said clearly in the conclusion to our piece on Outcome Scenarios, Trump will now have to go back to the negotiating table, and will be forced to offer up more than he did the last time the two sides negotiated. Humiliating.
In short, the Iranians have already won, and Trump/ the USA has already lost.
But will he negotiate?
Unfortunately, we don’t yet assess that Trump or his team have recognized that they have played all of their cards, and lost. So, we do assess that he will escalate at least one more time. We do assess that he will attempt one of the options we described above, most likely an attempt to seize Kharg, perhaps Greater Tunb. And the Iranians are, frankly, goading him to do so. Every time he tries to save face by announcing productive discussions with the Iranians, they announce that no such discussions have taken place. They know they have won already, that the longer this conflict goes on the deeper Trump will dig himself a hole, and the more likely he is ousted after the November mid-terms.
So, the clerics are more than happy for him to commit ground troops in an attempt to seize Kharg/ secure the Strait, knowing full well that no such operation will succeed in reopening the Strait to tanker traffic unless they wish it. They know full well that such an attempt will result in yet more egg on Trump’s face, and the inevitable US casualties will sound the death-knell on his party at the coming mid-terms, and thereby his presidency. If anything, Iran would love to draw this conflict out until right before the mid-terms, but we don’t think Trump has the patience for that. He will attempt one last effort to salvage some face from this godawful mess, hit rock bottom in the hole that he has dug for himself, and then weasel about to find an off-ramp where he can blame someone else for it all – probably Hegseth.
We see an end to the US military campaign against Iran (not necessarily the Israeli campaign) being a matter of weeks away, not months, despite Iranian attempts to prolong it and so add even more nails to Trump’s political coffin.
What an epic f*ck up.