A major shift is underway. Where it leads is still unclear – but all signs point towards deeper US involvement in Israel’s military campaign against Iran. The pre-conditions are largely in place, both politically and operationally, and the logic of escalation is closing fast. This piece breaks down the drivers, risks and likely consequences.
Political
President Trump has had a rough few weeks. His birthday parade was an embarrassment, the No Kings Day protests dwarfed the parade’s turnout, his decision to deploy troops against the California Governor’s wishes in Los Angeles has gone down poorly, and although US economic data has not yet shown deep damage from his tariff policies, it likely will soon.
He’s being sidelined and managed at the G7, is finally beginning to realise he has been wrong about Putin all along, his promises to end the Russia-Ukraine war have proven hollow, same for the conflict in Gaza, and his popularity ratings are sinking fast.
Trump has a notoriously thin skin – and history suggests he’ll now be looking to regain control of the narrative and reassert strength.
His base are pushing him to take a tougher line on Iran and with Israel having done the heavy lifting to establish safe air corridors into Iran, the risks – militarily and reputationally – are lower.
Israel is helping him here too – pro-Israel messaging is circulating widely across US platforms, calling for Washington to back Jerusalem’s strikes. With Iranian blood in the water, this could appear to Trump to be an opportunity for a clear political win – just as other policy chickens come home to roost.
Strategic
1. Nukes. There is no question that Iran should never have a nuclear weapon. From Israel’s perspective, the existential threat is clear – Iran’s leadership have explicitly threatened Israel’s existence, and has long linked nuclear capability to its anti-Israel posture. Some argue this is posturing – meant for internal or proxy audiences – but Israel takes it at face value, and we can see why. Yet, if Israel truly believes that Iran is close to developing such a weapon, then its pre-emptive strikes can be framed as self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Washington and Jerusalem don’t agree on how close Iran really is to a nuclear weapon – particularly around uranium enrichment thresholds. And while there’s political incentive for Netanyahu to invoke the nuclear threat – particularly after months of Iranian-backed attacks since 7th October 2023 – we have to say that we are inclined to believe Israeli intelligence is better than US intelligence on this issue. Israel has deeply penetrated Iran’s nuclear ecosystem – its visibility is arguably better than the US’. Indeed, much of what the US knows about Iran still comes from Israel.
Aside from Israel’s existential concerns, we ought to consider what it would mean globally if the current regime went nuclear. Ukraine’s experience illustrates the price of not having nuclear weapons – deterrence changes the rules. Before its 2006 nuclear test, North Korea was treated like any other pariah. Afterward – not so much. Now you barely hear about North Korea in the news – because once they had a nuclear weapon they joined the club of nations too powerful to challenge. Same with Russia.
So whether or not you believe Iran would use a nuclear weapon, the global consequences of it gaining one are clear. It would become harder to coerce, harder to contain, and far more dangerous. The world changes profoundly if Iran joins the nuclear club – and not for the better.
One other factor; as we explained in a recent post “come October this year the ability to renew [non-US JCPOA sanctions against Iran] expires, and the remaining powers that have the ability to re-impose them are unlikely to be able to agree by then … not least with Russia rotating into the Presidency of the UN Security Council that month.”
So, there’s a brief window of opportunity to strike at Iran whilst she is weak (economically, proxy-wise given Israel’s attrition of numerous of Iran’s proxies since 7th October 2023, and militarily given Israel’s recent strikes), and before Iran can regain strength after sanctions are lifted.
In a way, it is now … or never.
2. Regime Change. There are only two real routes to regime change in Iran – and both involve people on the ground. As Kosovo showed, air power alone is not enough.
Boots. No one has the appetite – or the bandwidth – for a ground invasion of Iran. Iraq’s legacy still looms large, and Iran’s own hand in bleeding US forces there is not forgotten. See: copper-cone EFPs, militia training, and cross-border logistics.
A US-led ground operation would be a hard sell to Trump’s base, and totally at odds with his ‘America First’ agenda. Israel can’t go it alone. And thanks to Trump’s abrasions with allies, there’s little prospect of a coalition.
At most, we might see Israeli or US special forces deploy – and even then, only for battle damage assessment or limited sabotage.
Bodies. Could Iran’s people rise up? Unlikely. They’ve tried repeatedly – at least once per decade – only to be crushed by regime security forces. Morale is low. So is belief in change.
If the clerics fall, it’s far more likely they’re replaced by the IRGC than by liberal reformers. That’s a worse outcome.
So in reality, the only viable objective for the US joining Israel is to delay Iran’s nuclear programme. Regime change? Unlikely – and possibly counterproductive.
Military / Technical
“Amateurs talk strategy. Professionals talk logistics.”
General Omar Bradley
Overnight on 16th – 17th June, the US moved a significant number of air-to-air refueling tankers across the Atlantic into bases in Europe. These include aging KC-135s, which can support anywhere from one to twenty aircraft depending on mission type. A B-1 Lancer bomber could drain a KC-135 entirely. An F-16 on overwatch pair might need a top-up every 45 minutes. However, all major US bombers – B-1, B-2, B-52 – can strike Natanz (more on this site’s significance later) from Diego Garcia without mid-air refueling.
Fighter jets are another story. From NAS Sigonella in Sicily, it’s ~4,000km to Natanz. An F-35C has a range of 2,200km (one-way), the F-22 – 3,000km. That means mid-air refueling both ways. Carrier aircraft like Super Hornets or F-35Cs launched from the USS Carl Vinson (currently in the Arabian Sea) would also rely on tanker support – especially if operating in contested airspace.
So why the tanker surge? Two reasons:
1. Threat. The mass pre-positioning of tankers signals serious intent. Just like sailing a carrier into the Arabian Sea, it shows capability and willingness – especially to support large formations of stealth and strike aircraft.
2. Intent. Let’s talk Natanz. Fordow’s enrichment plant lies ~80–90m underground. But Natanz has two sites – one relatively shallow (8m), but buried under layers of concrete and packed earth; the second possibly 100m down.
To destroy these, the US would need bunker-busting munitions. Israel’s GBU-28s can penetrate ~6m of reinforced concrete. The US has heavier tools: the GBU-72/B and the GBU-57/B MOP (Massive Ordnance Penetrator), the latter of which can reach ~60m. But those munitions are few in number – and it would require precision, follow-up strikes into the same crater to penetrate all the way into the enrichment plants.
Only a B-2 can carry two MOPs. And once that first strike hits, Iran will know what to expect. That makes repeat passes more dangerous – and total air dominance essential. So yes, you’ll need B-2 stealth bombers. But you’ll also need F-22s to sanitise the skies, F-35s for SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences), electronic warfare support, AWACS … and the tankers to keep them all aloft.
This is why the tankers are so key.
Iranian Response
Iran’s leadership understands exactly what the US and Israel want to achieve: delay the bomb, and maybe shake the regime. That makes this existential. Expect a dual response:
1. Domestic. The regime will roll out propaganda fast – invoking the “Little Satan / Great Satan” trope. It will pre-emptively deploy forces to crush unrest, especially in Kurdistan, Baluchistan, and Khuzestan.
2. External. Iran will likely hit back across the region. US bases in Iraq, Bahrain, and the UAE are all in range. Qatar may be spared. UK forces might not – even if the UK avoids direct involvement, Tehran will see basing and logistics as fair game.
And then there’s Hormuz. Iran doesn’t have to close the strait outright – it just has to raise insurance risk. The Houthis managed an 80% drop in Red Sea traffic with a handful of drones and missiles. Iran, with submarines, sea mines, and fast boats, can do far more.
Markets will react fast. OPEC is already increasing production to pre-empt a shock. But Iran knows that too – and it has hit oil infrastructure before (see: Abqaiq-Khurais, 2019).
Likely Outcome
If the US joins Israel in striking Iran, the most likely outcome is this:
- Iran’s nuclear programme is delayed, not destroyed. They have domestic uranium mines and know-how. They’ll rebuild.
- Regime change is unlikely. If anything, the IRGC gains power … which is worse.
- US and UK assets across the Gulf are hit. Even if the UK stays out militarily, it will pay a price for basing support.
- Relations with Gulf allies suffer. Host governments may question the risks of continuing to host Western forces.
- Markets are roiled. Expect price spikes, trade rerouting, and long-term energy shocks.
- Russia and China won’t intervene directly, but will exploit the moment. Moscow will cry hypocrisy; Beijing will hint at Taiwan parallels. Neither is likely to strike now – but both will bank the narrative.
- Europe stays sidelined. France, the UK, and others won’t join strikes, but their basing support will be enough to invite Iranian reprisals.
And even if Iran’s nuclear facilities are cratered, the damage to global order, regional stability, and economic recovery could be profound.
Final Take
Trump has the political incentive. The military has the logistics. Israel has done the groundwork. And Iran, for now, is weak and exposed.
If a US strike is coming – and all the signs say it is – it won’t be clean, it won’t be strategic, and it won’t change the regime. But it will send a message.
The question is whether the world is ready for the reply.