There’s a military practice called Effects Based Planning; first, determine your desired outcome, or effect, then choose the course of action and tool that will generate that effect. Right now, Iran is demonstrating mastery of this approach. Remember that this is a regime that has had a long, long, long time to ponder what they’d do in the event of an existential crisis – basically since they took power in 1979. Plus, they’ve had lots of other examples to learn from about US military might versus political resolve – Iraq and Afghanistan in particular. What we’re seeing now is an exceedingly well thought through, and executed, example of Effects Based Planning on a grand strategic level.
We’re not saying this out of admiration for the regime, don’t get us wrong, but to highlight a concern that, frankly, the US and Israel may be being outplayed here. Which is really surprising because the Israelis have long been highly sophisticated militarily and intelligence-wise, but with respect to this particular conflict they appear to have pulled the pin on a grenade without any discernible plan to control the resulting explosion (more later).
Indeed, only today (4th March) Israeli Defence Minister Israel Katz declared that they would assassinate “any leader” that emerges post Ayatollah Khamenei’s death. Really? Even a moderate, reformist, un-zealous candidate?
Strategic Effect
As we laid out in Under Pressure Iran did not make a mistake in firing drones and missiles into neighbouring states such as Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They struck so as to generate vicarious political and diplomatic pressure on the US and Israel to cease attacking Iran – they attacked to achieve this effect. Even a single drone or missile entering UAE or KSA airspace, regardless of whether it hit a target or was intercepted, automatically generated pressure from the UAE and KSA on US/Israeli leadership. The UAE is frustrated that the illusion that Dubai/ Abu Dhabi offer supreme safety for residents and businesses has been shattered – so they pressure USA/ Israel. KSA’s frustrated at being dragged in, not least after they deliberately and clearly tried to distance themselves from the coming attacks by denying US military overflight through Saudi airspace – so they pressure USA/ Israel.
Nor did Iran make a mistake firing Shahed drones into Dubai airport, or Kuwait airport, or at Qatari gas export terminals, or at KSA’s Ras Tanura oil facility. Again, even a single drone, whether it hits the facility or is shot down, is sufficient to achieve an effect – in this case either shutting down air transport across the region or strangling oil and gas supply to the world. A slow, continued onslaught simply extends the desired effect over time. The result? Pressure not only from UAE, KSA and Qatar on US/ Israel, but pressure too from any nation that uses a drop of oil or a spurt of gas (so everyone, then) and, in time, pressure even from US citizens far, far removed from the violence when the price of gasoline jumps up at the pump – and just in time for the November mid-terms, no less. Lots of effect. This was deliberate, this was calculated, this was strategic Effects Based Planning.
What Next?
So, understanding the above, we can understand that the Iranian regime is cleverly pushing to generate maximum pressure on Israel and the USA to cease attacking. They know that there is not widespread, global, popular support for the US/Israeli attacks. Indeed, there’s even a sliver of opportunity to take advantage of this doubt, and skew world opinion further against the US and Israel, and potentially even in Iran’s favour (to a degree). And Iran is a master at influencing opinion – after Hamas attacked Israel on 7th October 2023 they got to work, and very effectively so. So expert was their influence (another word for which is propaganda) via social media and numerous other channels, that, amazingly, they managed to convince left-wing groups across Europe and North America to root for right-wing Hamas.
Israel will, of course, remain the prime focus. Iran’s leadership has never concealed its ideological hostility toward Israel, and Israeli targets – military, political or civilian – remain central to its strategic calculus.
Were, however, Iran to inflict large numbers of civilian casualties in Gulf states, it would risk turning regional, and indeed global, opinion decisively against itself. Tehran therefore has every incentive to avoid killing Saudis, Emiratis, Qataris or other third-country nationals. American personnel and facilities are, however, a different matter entirely. Casualties among US citizens would have immediate domestic political consequences in Washington – particularly in an election year – which makes them far more strategically valuable targets from Iran’s perspective.
This is why yesterday (3rd March) we saw the US State Department issue a notice to US citizens in 14 nations across the Middle East either advising them not to travel there (Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen), or to reconsider travel (Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, KSA, and UAE), or to “exercise increased caution” (Egypt). (Note – reports that the US State Department issued a more extreme “depart now” were false). Meanwhile, the UK’s Foreign Office issued a gentle “Shelter In Place” – because nothing more was needed. First, the USA knows that Iran will see American civilians and service personnel not only as fair game, but as highly desirable targets. Second, Trump’s team know that every American death influences American voters in the coming mid-terms; voters that are already skeptical that Trump’s attacks on Iran are a rather wag-the-dog effort to distract from the Epstein scandal, and who already don’t like foreign entanglements that cost American blood and treasure. Lots of effect.
So, what we’re saying here is, notwithstanding a technical fault in a missile or Shahed that makes it land in the wrong place, and notwithstanding a missile or Shahed being partially intercepted such that it falls into a civilian area (as happened with the Fairmont The Palm in Dubai), Iran has not only no interest in targeting civilian areas in Dubai, or Bahrain, or Qatar, or KSA, but also actively wants to avoid inflicting non-US and non-Israeli civilian deaths in these GCC nations.
Ok, but what if Iran wants to ramp up, and foment even greater pressure on the USA and Israel from Gulf states, as well as practically every other nation in the world? Rather than targeting (non-US/Israeli) civilians and tipping fragile and wavering global opinion in favour of the US/Israeli strikes, they’re far more likely to intensify their attacks on key infrastructure. In addition to transport infrastructure they could well target electricity generation and transmission, water desalination and supply, food production and supply, fertilizer production and supply, as well as widening their attacks on oil and gas infrastructure so as to further increase prices worldwide and hit every nation. Again, grand strategic Effects Based Planning – not wanton destruction and death.
The only point at which the Iranian regime would seriously consider attacking innocent GCC and third-country civilians in residential or commercial areas of the GCC would be at the moment of very, very last resort. If they had exhausted literally every other option to sway the world against the US/Israeli attacks, and the regime was precipitously close to crumbling, then and only then would they consider killing large numbers of non-US/non-Israeli citizens, in the hope that international outrage would increase pressure on the USA, but they’d measure this against the very significant risk it actually causes the world to say “good work Donald/ Bibi – now finish the job”.
And is the regime likely to get to such a point of total desperation? We think not. As we said at the start, they have had a long, long time to prepare for this – creating government succession plans, bunkers, a massive land army, and learning well from Iraq and Afghanistan that the US does not have the patience or resolve for long term conflicts abroad and certainly no tolerance for significant US civilian or military casualties. And Trump doesn’t have either the patience, or the time – not least with the US mid-terms approaching in November. So really, all the regime needs to do is endure, hopefully sway world opinion into pressure on US/ Israel, and emerge from the rubble after.
Controlling An Exploding Grenade
As we promised above, we’ll now touch on one consideration about what, we hope, Israel is trying to achieve with its own grand strategic Effects Based Planning. In Crunch Time For Iran, where we predicted the US/Israeli strikes would occur on the very weekend that they in fact did, we offered a viable solution to this whole mess:
“Recall that one of the greatest mistakes made during the Iraq invasion was the wholesale disbandment of not only the ruling Ba’ath Party but also the Iraqi military. As a result, both state apparatuses mobilized against the coalition. What the US and Israel could do in Iran is to appeal to a select few more commercially-minded members of Iran’s military apparatus (remembering that the IRGC in particular is deeply entwined into Iran’s business world), suggest that they could remain in power and enrich themselves if they only overthrow/ dispose of the clerics and their more zealous military colleagues, quash the nuclear programme, and utilize Iran’s existing governance apparatus combined with increasing sanctions relief to exact real and lasting change for Iran, at a pace that does not provoke war, civil war, widespread unrest, or bloodletting.”
So far, the US and Israel have killed about 50 key leadership personnel in Iran’s regime. We’re not yet convinced, but we’re hoping (flimsy, we know) that they are actually trying to control the resulting explosion after pulling the pin on the grenade. If they can eliminate all of the hardline clerics, IRGC officers and Basij officers that might have been candidates to rule, then all that is left to choose from are the moderate, reformist characters that could be more amenable to Iran surrendering its nuclear ambitions, surrendering its proxy links, and rejoining the world as a stable, not necessarily democratic but at least un-disruptive, and prosperous nation.
Early reports indicate that Ayatollah Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba, has been appointed as Supreme Leader – which is … interesting. He’s not especially popular, certainly in clerical circles, and in general the regime is not a fan of dynastic power – it’s a bit too reminiscent of the Shah (king), of whom they have awful memories (his appalling rule ushered in the 1979 revolution). So, in a way, it does suggest their choices are becoming limited, but Mojtaba’s certainly not the kind of reformist, progressive, moderate candidate that the Israelis would have been aiming for. Even the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini (founder of the Republic, different to Khamenei), Hassan, is more progressive than Mojtaba. Nonetheless, if we’re right about this plan, then Mojtaba is unlikely to be in the hot seat for too long, so we’ll soon see the next evolution.