After threatening the destruction of Iran’s “whole civilisation”, President Trump has now moved back towards negotiations. As we have consistently predicted, that pivot was always likely. But it leaves us with one big question. What – if anything – has the conflict actually achieved?
The short answer is that US objectives were never clearly defined. They were inconsistently articulated and have not translated into durable strategic outcomes. Simultaneously, Iran has consistently demonstrated it has the ability to impose disruption at scale and with relatively low cost. The result is not a clean victory for either side but it has clearly shifted leverage that now favours Iran in several key areas.
The Pakistan brokered ceasefire is already looking fragile. Reports of renewed pressure around the Strait of Hormuz, while US forces remain on alert in the region, suggest that the underlying balance has not been stabilised. This early slippage reinforces the central point. This conflict has not resolved core tensions and Iran retains the ability to reapply pressure at will.
War Aims
It is difficult to identify a consistent set of US war aims. Different officials framed different objectives at different times and those objectives shifted throughout the conflict. That alone complicates any claim of success. However, we can assess several areas that would reasonably have sat at the centre of any such campaign.
1. Regime Change
Iran’s ruling regime structure remains in place. We could surmise that elements of the system have been damaged and internal dynamics may have shifted but there has been no collapse of the revolution.
More importantly, this conflict appears to have reinforced regime resilience. Having absorbed sustained military pressure without systemic breakdown, Tehran is now likely to be less susceptible to coercion in future negotiations. At the same time, it has been able to position itself internationally as a state that withstood external attack, shaping perceptions in parts of the Global South.
2. Nuclear Programme
There is no clear evidence that core nuclear capabilities have been decisively eliminated. Any temporary disruption does not equate to long-term dismantlement.
Iran has signalled, as part of ceasefire discussions, that it may limit aspects of its nuclear posture. However, such commitments have historically been reversible and difficult to verify. More broadly, the conflict may have altered Iran’s strategic calculus. Rather than accelerating towards a weapon, it has demonstrated that it can impose costs without one.
3. Uranium Enrichment
Iran continues to assert its right to enrich uranium. There is absolutely no indication that enrichment capacity has been permanently halted.
Even where enrichment has been slowed, the underlying capability remains. As in previous cycles, disruption is not the same as elimination. The programme can be degraded but not easily removed.
4. Missile and Drone Capability
Iran’s military infrastructure has been degraded in some places but it is far from neutralised. It retains the ability to deploy drones and missiles across the region.
More importantly, the conflict has reinforced the effectiveness of relatively low cost, asymmetric systems against far more expensive defensive architectures. That lesson will not be lost on Iran – or indeed on other actors observing the conflict.
5. Proxies
Iran’s regional network has been weakened in some areas, particularly where Israeli operations had already reduced capability. However, crucially, it remains functional.
The Houthis, in particular, continue to demonstrate their ability to threaten key maritime chokepoints. The broader point is that Iran retains multiple channels through which it can apply pressure indirectly, complicating any effort to contain it.
6. Oil and Market Control
The idea that the conflict would meaningfully constrain China’s access to energy has not held. Oil remains a globally priced commodity and disruptions affect all consumers.
What has changed however is the visibility and credibility of supply disruption risk. Iran has demonstrated that it can materially affect flows through critical chokepoints and that capability now carries greater weight in market pricing.
The Real Outcomes
If the stated objectives remain at best unclear, the second and third order effects are far more tangible.
1. Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz has moved from a background risk to a central variable in global markets.
As an international strait, it falls under the transit passage regime established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (see Article 37). That framework is designed to ensure the uninterrupted flow of global trade. Any move toward charging transit fees – or imposing conditions on access – would sit in tension with that principle.
Even the perception that passage can be restricted or priced marks a shift – from rules based access to negotiated access. That shift matters – bigly. It introduces a structural risk premium into global energy markets that did not previously exist at this scale.
A Very Large Crude Carrier typically carries around 2 million barrels. Even relatively small additional costs at the transit stage feed through the entire value chain – refining, transport, distribution – ultimately raising end user prices. The result is not a one off spike but the potential for a sustained uplift in global energy costs.
2. Iranian Leverage
Iran has demonstrated that it does not need overwhelming military superiority to exert influence. Its ability to selectively disrupt shipping, target infrastructure and generate market volatility has been clearly established.
This is not about dominance. It is about leverage. The capacity to impose cost – quickly, visibly and at relatively low expense – has increased Iran’s strategic weight both regionally and globally.
3. Limits of Military Power
The conflict has highlighted the limits of high end military capability when confronted with decentralised, asymmetric systems.
Advanced platforms, precision weapons and layered defences remain effective but they do not eliminate the ability of a determined adversary to impose disruption. The cost asymmetry is stark and the implications extend beyond this conflict and into future theatres.
4. Regional Calculus
For Gulf States, the conflict reinforces a difficult reality. Hosting external military assets may provide deterrence but it also creates exposure. If such assets attract strikes without guaranteeing protection, regional actors will reassess the balance between security partnerships and sovereign risk. That recalibration may take time but the direction of travel is becoming clearer.
5. Alliances and Alignment
The conflict has exposed friction within Western alignment structures. Diverging responses, reluctance to participate and constraints on operational support all point to a more fragmented coalition environment.
This does not signal collapse but it does indicate that alignment cannot be assumed. Future operations are likely to face greater political and logistical friction.
6. Global Positioning
So let’s look at the bigger picture. The conflict has accelerated existing shifts in global alignment. Countries are increasingly hedging – diversifying economic, political and security relationships rather than relying on a single anchor. The perception of unpredictability in US decision-making has contributed to that trend, even if it is not the sole driver.
7. Economic and Political Spillover
Energy markets remain elevated and volatile. Even if flows stabilise, the lag in supply chains means that pricing effects will persist. Higher energy costs feed directly into inflation, transport and production. The economic impact will be felt well beyond the region and will take time to unwind. Politically, that creates pressure across multiple jurisdictions, including within the United States.
Conclusion
This was not a clean victory for Iran. Nor were there any clear successes for the United States.
Instead, this conflict has exposed a more complex reality. US objectives were unclear and only at best partially realised, while Iran has demonstrated an ability to impose disruption and shape market outcomes without needing to win in a conventional sense.
The early fragility of the ceasefire underlines that little has been resolved. The underlying balance has shifted, not settled.
The most important change is not who won but what has been revealed. Control over critical chokepoints, the effectiveness of asymmetric systems and the limits of rapid coercive power are now clearer to all involved.
Markets will price that in. And once priced, it rarely disappears quickly.